Features of the state and imperious discourse in the conditions of development of digital communications

Marina Chekunova
Ph.D., Associate Professor, Associate Professor of Mass Communications
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia
Moscow, Russia
Chekunova@gmail.com

Viktor Barabash
Doctor of Philology, Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Philology, Head of the Department of Mass Communications
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia
Moscow, Russia

Abstract–**The article presents the results of the analysis of the consequences for the state-power discourse connected with the development of Internet communications. The author reveals the tendencies of increasing the role of the power discourse on the Internet with the representation of the modern image of politics. The conducted research confirms the hypothesis about the transition from the subject-object to the subject-subject model of political discourse, set by digital technologies. The tendencies of formation of the system of "discursive democracy" are revealed. The author opposes the widespread approach to depriving the state in the conditions of the development of Internet communications of its former axiological functions. The article proves the presence of the factor influence of the Internet on the discursive tendencies of re-ideologization in the positioning of national states. The author substantiates the change in the new conditions of the structure and content of the political text, the growing subjectivity of politics in modern discursive space.**

Keywords–*discourse, the Internet, communications, twitter-revolution, the state, Deliberative democracy, reideologization*

I. FORESIGHT OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE USSR

Judging by various evidences, the USSR in the development of its analogue to the American Internet (originally ARPANET) went in parallel with the United States. Its Soviet design version was presented by the OGAS system. The leak of information about its development caused an information wave in the West about the attempt to establish total electronic control in the USSR. The phraseological turns of this kind were also used - "the punch card manages the Kremlin." It was assumed that under the introduction of the new system, not only the government would be able to control societies, but it itself was subject to established controls. The threat of loss of management's decision-making capabilities may have played a decisive role in the winding down of the OGAS project. According to memoirs, the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers A.A. Kosygin received warnings that the implementation of the OGAS project would be under control, its activities would become completely transparent, and this, in the end, paralyzes the work. the political changes produced by the development of new communication systems were projected [1].

II. UPDATING THE REQUEST FOR RESEARCH ON CHANGES IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNET

The fact that The Internet fundamentally changes the system of political communications and in general the sphere of political understanding in the political expert community back in the 1990s. there are the first studies about the Internet factor in the modernization of the political sphere. On the problem of the reflection of Internet communications in the modern political space conducted research: Agre F., Akdeniz Y., Franklin M., Chadwick A., Howard F., Dodge M., Kitchin R., Reinhold H., Kurbaliya J., etc. As the Internet spreads in Russia, Russian scientists Chugunov A.V., Mihajlova O.V., Grachev M.N., Volodenkov S.V., Vershinin M.S. explore the phenomenon of Internet communications in the refraction of the political space.

Power decisions on the development of the relevant sphere played a significant role in catalyzing the research interest in the political consequences of the Internet and the expansion of the Internet space. Initially, this interest was catalyzed by the initiation of the creation of an electronic government system [2]. The next step was the adoption at the federal level of a program to develop the "digital economy" expressed by the President's interest in it [3].

Another factor catalyzing the research interest was real changes in the system of public communications, the development of civil society institutions, manifested in the emergence of the blogosphere, Internet forums, microblogging, Internet pages of state authorities. With this kind of communication opportunities for social assemblies at the level of public relations, the subject-object system of relations between the state and society could no longer function as before.

The third of the main factors was the role played by Internet communications in the "color revolutions" of the new wave. It became obvious that the government

was losing in any way at the level of control over space and internet. the power structures were generally unprepared. Accordingly, the topic of "color revolutions" and the Internet could not but become one of the most topical for political scientists [4].

In the classical system of building political discourse, the sources of discursity were television, radio and the press. In a model that can be conventionally defined as post-classical, their value is reduced. Political news information is increasingly drawn into the Internet, which has obvious advantages in the speed of its presentation. There are categories of the population that have completely abandoned television. This has previously been the case with radio and periodicals. This turn is even more prolonged, due to duplication in the format of Internet versions of television and radio broadcasts, newspaper and magazine publications.

III. INTERNET DISCOURSE AS THE NEW POLITICAL REALITY OF POWER POSITIONING

How large is the inclusion in political discourse through new means of communication of national power elites? According to 2014 calculations, 68% of heads of world states and governments had their own accounts. It's48 It is believed that the fashion for Twitter among politicians was established by Barack Obama, who set up an account back in March 2007, while he was a senator. fourth place in the world. It is currently in its third position with more than 100 million subscribers. Current U.S. President Donald Trump is in 18th place, with 53.5 million followers. So far, the general rating positions are dominated by cult characters of mass culture, which reflects the general persistence of apolitical sentiment in the majority [5].

A symbolic signal for the elites was the registration in April 2009 of the Twitter account of the British royal family. A year later, a Facebook account was started. A few microblogs on Twitter opened and the Spanish royal family. This turn in attitudes towards new means of communication by the monarchs, traditionally perceived as custodians of conservative traditions, meant legitimizing digital technology as a means of political discourse in all elite circles, including the most traditionalist segment.

The same significant turn was the appearance of the accounts of spiritual leaders on social networks. One of the first - back in 2008, The Twitter and Facebook accounts were started by the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama XIV. from the danger of plunging a person into a "parallel reality." The next head of the Catholic Church, Francis himself, has already been an active author of Twitter. Since 2015, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has had his own account on the network.

Initially, Twitter was used mainly by politicians as an auxiliary tool. Mostly, Twitter messages served as links to more detailed news messages posted on portals and blogs on the network. This conclusion was reached by American researchers in 2010, who studied Twitter by members of the U.S. Congress [6]. Over the years,

the situation has fundamentally changed, and short Tweets themselves turn out to be the core of political discourse.

The popularity of Twitter is also defined by the crisis of traditional reading culture. Long texts lose their appeal, which also applies to political texts.

Social media is increasingly legally involved in the political process as an institution of democracy. Thus, back in July 2011, the United States hosted the first ever debate on the Internet, which involved six candidates for the Republican presidential nomination. Since 2012, the debate between US presidential candidates has been covered on Twitter online.

The extent to which the power elite is included in the blogosphere is evidenced by the frequency of politicians posting online. changes the political style itself. Information resonance becomes not just an important component of political action, but often the political action itself is built for the tasks of information resonance. There is a formula that the event is only real when it is presented photo report on social networks. By comparison, Russian governors make 1.85 entries per day (55 per month) on Internet platforms, while Nigerian heads of state make 0.81 entries (24 per month) [7].

Analysis of the preferences of digital means of political communication among Western politicians revealed the following ranking: 1. e-mail; 2. blogs; 3. social networks. The same ranking is found in representatives of the Russian authorities [8].

IV. RUSSIAN OVER-THE-GOVERNMENT ELITE IN THE BLOGOSPHERE

In the Russian segment, The head of the government D.A. Medvedev is steadily leading Twitter Navalny [9].

Social media accounts are becoming a familiar tool of the governor's power. However, the attitude to this tool in the regions is different. According to the monitoring of "Youth ONF" in the summer of 2017 did not have their social media accounts 32 governors against 53 who have accounts [10].

Five years earlier, the situation, according to the "National Monitoring Service" (report "The heads of regions of the Russian Federation in the blogosphere - the results of 2012.) was broadly similar. The social media accounts did not have 36 governors versus 47. Some increase in activity has occurred, but not so significant, which allows us to talk not about the trend, and the difference in political styles.

The absolute leader among the governor's corps on social media activity was expected to be the head of the Republic of Chechnya - Ramzan Kadyrov (combined on all accounts - 4 million 532 thousand subscribers). His microblogging records differ markedly from most governors with an emphasis on value-meaning and emotionally-colored author's position. rather, an information news report, which essentially duplicates the content of official sites. Here are a number of

characteristic twitter posts by the head of the Republic of Chechnya.

"Mikheil Saakashvili was detained in Kiev. Put it on the floor. While he was loyal to the Ukrainian authorities, he was perceived as a bright race. He created opposition forces and became a criminal. Here it is a volder democracy and a lesson for Saakashvili. I wanted to make Ukraine happy by escaping from Georgia!»

"Criminal responsibility should be for those who deliberately distort thetruth about WWAR. Thousands of our soldiers and officers were killed every day in the Battle of Stalingrad, but the army survived, defeated Paulus, Romanian, Italian divisions, Croatian units. Eternal Glory to heroes!»

"Thenew list of the United States. Unprecedented in the history of mankind self-confidence and recklessness! In today's world, you can't take such stupid steps. Without Russia, they will not be able to solve any international problem. Sobering will come! And it will have an effect that the figures of the United States did not dream of! »

"TheU.S. government has suspended work. No funding. Running through the Middle East, shedding blood in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, moving the embassy to Jerusalem, interfering in foreign affairs around the world, drove their own government to a standstill. Bravo!» [11].

Following Kadyrov on the total number of subscribers on social networks settled down: the governor of the Moscow region Andrey Vorobyov; Yunus-bek Evkurov, head of the Republic of Ingushetia; The head of Crimea, Sergei Aksenov; Alexander Brechalov, head of the Republic of Udmurtia; The head of the Republic of Tyva, Sholban Kara-ool; Governor of the Nenets Autonomous Region Igor Koshin; Artur Parfenchikov, head of the Republic of Karelia [12]. The monitoring of the "Youth OFON" noted numerous precedents, when through the access to the accounts of the governor representatives of civil society managed to draw the attention of the authorities to the acute problem situations in the respective regions.

In general, the governor's social media accounts played a positive role not only in building mechanisms of power and public communication, but also even more in "humanizing" the image of power. Personal microblogs have provided an opportunity to move away from the bureaucratic language of imperious representation. Simple words coming personally from the governor - "we will sort it out," "solve," "consult" generally increased the attractiveness of the personalities of the governor's corps.

Special projects are initiated in a targeted way aimed at communication between the authorities and civil society. Such a project for the Moscow region was, in particular, which started work on October 1, 2015, the Internet portal "Dobrodel" The system of the portal was structured in such a way that the request sent was automatically redirected to the relevant agency. A total of 17 thematic categories cover the widest possible range of issues that could potentially worry citizens. Agencies are required to respond to a request within eight days and either resolve the problem or specify a timeline for resolving it. During the month, the portal receives up to 35,000 appeals from citizens, which, bearing in mind the installation on providing answers for each appeal, brings power-and-public communication to a fundamentally new level [13].

A significant innovation in the development of power and public communications was the project "Active Citizen" initiated in 2014 by the Government of Moscow. As part of the project, electronic voting was conducted among Muscovites concerning the current issues of the city's development. In total, about two thousand such surveys were conducted, in which more than one and a half million people took part. The project was positioned as the implementation of the model of direct democracy.

V. FROM SUBJECT-OBJECT TO SUBJECT-SUBJECT POLITICAL MODEL: A NEW POLITICAL-DISCURSIVE REALITY

Internet forums are an increasingly important indicator of public sentiment. In forums, political activities, including those of the State, are assessed from different angles. In a large part of cases, this assessment is sharply critical. The presence of a direct and rapid assessment by the authorities involved in forum communications does not allow the latter to create myths of legitimization in the way that was possible in the era before the advent of the Internet phenomenon. However, there is also a threat to present the position of the forum as the position of the whole society. The increased concentration on Internet platforms of "language of hostility" also draws attention to itself [10]. Attempts are being made to manage the content of forums by targeting the position for or against a policy actor. There are professional groups working on various forums for political purpose.

Assessment of politics in the Internet age by society can now be carried out not only in classical formats of elections and referendums, public demonstrations, sociological measurements of electoral preferences. A new form of evaluation is the nomination of "likes" and "dislikes" expressing approval or disapproval of the political text. The analysis of the ratio of "likes" and "dislikes" is in fact a new emerging direction of political sociology. The results of their calculation are, at least, information taken into account by policy makers. At the same time, it is necessary to note that until very recently the political study of the phenomenon of "likes" of political texts was not undertaken.

The theory in this regard, as in general with regard to the political implications of the development of the Internet, is lagging behind the practice. Meanwhile, analysis of "personal traces" on the Internet was already practically used during the 2016 US presidential campaign in programming personal-oriented political ads in support of candidate Donald Trump. According to some experts, Trump, having lost all the televised debates, beat Hillary Clinton precisely due to new

advanced Internet technologies built on the compilation of voter psychograms [14].

In the transition to Internet communications, social and political discourse has become less resource-intensive, and, accordingly, more accessible to citizens. The emergence of party-political newspapers and magazines played a fundamental importance in the expansion of social and political discourse. Around the relevant newspaper, as a propaganda mouthpiece, ideological like-minded people were concentrated, parties crystallized. The role of «Iskra» and «Pravda» newspapers in the Russian revolutionary movement was theoretically understood and assessed in Soviet historiography as one of the most important factors of part-building [15]. However, the publication of newspapers required some funding, and the publication of the article involved the passage of the relevant editing, correlated with the position of the party. The Internet has opened up opportunities for a fundamentally less costly representation of political position, and, as a result, democratization (accessibility) and individualization (non-affiliation with power or party structures) of political discourse. A new political-discursive reality is being formed, in which the centers of discourse are objectively blurred, and the very discursive space from the central one evolves into the network [16].

VI. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE TWITTER REVOLUTION

To characterize the changes in political life under the influence of new digital technologies, Evgeny Morozov, a Belarusian-born researcher, introduced the relatively widespread concept of the Twitter Revolution. The empirical basis for its introduction was the protest actions of the Moldovan youth in 2009 in connection with accusations of falsification of the results of the parliamentary elections. When organizing a flash mob - access to the main square of Chisinau with lit candles - widely used the possibilities of social networks. According to experts, It was Twitter that became a key tool in disseminating information and organizing flash mob. The result of the protest actions - the "Twitter revolution" was the loss of political power in the republic by the Communist Party [17].

The theory of the "Twitter revolution" was further developed in the works of Professor of New York University, social media researcher Clay Shirky. He declares a new era of the Emergence of the Internet, of tectonic changes in all spheres of life, including the political sphere, under its influence. The Twitter revolution or the Internet revolution inevitably turns out to be, in Shirka's opinion, a social revolution. The invention of the phone established communication with one, television - many - with one, and the Internet - many with many. The former spectators, objects of the political process, turn out to be active political actors. In the new realities, Shirki believes, the government should abandon the very task of establishing unanimity, which in the conditions of pluralistic plurality is impossible. The best thing the government can do, from his point of view, is to create platforms for different group communications and associations. Shirki refers to Barack Obama's successful experience [18].

The Internet by the American essayist J. P. Barlow [19]. It's not a T.P. Kalugin uses the image of the Kunstcamera to reveal the Internet paradigm, emphasizing the fundamental absence of a standard in it [20]. All this was embedded in the concept of the impossibility of managing power political discourse in the Internet era.

Indeed, one can agree with Shirky that totalitarian unanimity in the internet age is unattainable. But this does not mean that the state should refuse to present its value position at all under the new conditions. With the natural individualization of opinions in any community, there is a value framework shared by the majority. The Internet of this unity of the majority of society in basic values does not abolish. Complicating the tasks of value positioning for the state related to the transition to subject-subject communications with citizens, does not mean that because of the technological complexity of the relevant functions should be completely abandoned.

In contrast to the group of authors who emphasized the Process of Individualization produced by the Internet, others, on the contrary, emphasized its integration and socio-building functions. In particular, the Attention of the Spanish sociologist and representative of the post-Marxist direction Manuel Castels emphasized the social characteristics of the Internet [21]. The Internet is used by a number of authors, introduced in a wide circulation to characterize the mass media Canadian philosopher M. McLuhan image of a "global village", with an emphasis on its cooperative functions [22]. But the conclusion about the integration potentials of the Internet means the exact opposite position on the possibilities of the political discourse of the state, than it was required from the concept of individualization. social assemblies, there must be, accordingly, a political force legitimizing this cooperation.

VII. A DELIBERATIVE OR DISCURSIVE MODEL OF DEMOCRACY

The traditional Internet perspective on the further democratization of political regimes needs to be fleshed out. Of course, the new possibilities of Internet communications involve a much wider mass in political discourse than it was before. However, the very category of democracy today is ambiguous and has many interpretations correlated with different scientific schools and national traditions. To think, in particular, that the internet era opens the door to the affirmation of a model of democracy of classical understanding, as the power of the majority, would not be correct. Active Internet users included in the political discourse do not make up the majority of society, and accordingly, Internet discourse cannot replace political expression. At the same time, the expansion of communication opportunities between the government and society, the bilateralness of political discourse allow us to talk about the trends of the development of the model of democracy in the version of the deliberative model.

Introduced in wide circulation J. M. Bessetom and development in theory by Y. Habermas model of deliberative democracy gets prospects for practical implementation precisely in connection with the development of digital communication mechanisms [23]. The rhetoric of the imperious discourse is changing. discussions objectively set the relevant trends.

The term "discursive democracy" is also used in literature as an analogue definition of "deliberative democracy". This conceptual correction allows us to focus on the linguistic side of the ongoing political transformations [24].

VIII. SUBJECTIVITY OF POLITICAL TEXT AND TWITTER POLICY

The other side of the coin was the opposite of the prospects for democratic transit, the process of restoring the subjectivity of politicians. In the classical management model, political actions and statements required appropriate procedural approvals. The politician in his public speeches formulated not a personal position, but the position of the institution presented to him. With the advent of the possibility of doing personal blogs, politicians receive a means of public expression of their own point of view, not the position of the institution. There are also precedents for their disagreement. This was particularly resonant in the Phenomenon of Trump's Twitter. Comments on Twitter of the Us President are not always known to express the position of the White House and especially the American political elite.

It was in Twitter that Trump made the most resonant statements. The word "Twitter diplomacy" has appeared in political circles [25]. Twitter, in the case of the American president, was a more representative source than classical channels of communication.

The President of the United States himself told ITV that Twitter provides him with a great opportunity to convey the truth to his millions of followers. American president, traditional channels of communication do not give truthful information. The second advantage of the new communication system is connected to it with the speed of achieving political resonance, the ability to make a policy in real time. "I love it," Trump explains of her twitter addiction, "that speed, I love the power she carries in herself because she lets you get her point of view. I can fight fake news because I have so many subscribers." [26].

"Twitter diplomacy" for the context of international political processes means an increased degree of risk from a politician making quick, emotional decisions that become a political message. A snippet of text from Trump's Twitter account, "Ready for Russia, missiles are flying. Good, new and smart missiles" - in fact could provoke a real all-human catastrophe. Experts compared the current situation in Russian-American relations with the Caribbean crisis of 1962 [27].

The subjectivity of the political text returns to the public policy space. The period of the conjugation of politics with ideological discourse was characterized by the type of politician - the author of the political text. The content of this text was a manifested ideological message. Typical was the image of a politician with attribution - a book that today actually disappeared connotator from the symbolic space of politics. Assemblies of political writings - Lenin, Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini, Mao Tse-tung, de Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh are still a source of inspiration for the proponent of the respective ideological movements. Since the 1970s, a new type of policy has been formed, whose public appearances are no longer an author's reflection, but a compilation of textual developments by speechwriter groups. Typically, such texts, before getting to politics, multi-stage bureaucratic filtering. The final text, voiced by the politician, was the position of the power institution as a whole.

The new era has brought back the subjectivity of the political text. However, the new auto-subject political text differed, both in content and form, from the auto-subject texts of the classical type. The format of the deployed ideological demonstrations was actually lost. But there was a genre of brief - from two to six suggestions of comments on the current policy. And these comments, at least for now, are not the subject of filtering and procedural approvals by institutions. It should be assumed that with the further spread of the discourse of new auto-subject political communications and the growing precedents of divergence of the official position of power and the views of political personalities, the question of controlling the comments of politicians in Twitter, Instagram, etc. will inevitably be delivered.

It is noted in connection with the simplification of the procedure of posting text on the Internet a decrease in the genre-stylistic level of political discourse. There is a tendency to distribute texts for the authorship of the authorities, built on colloquial understated vocabulary. On the other hand, the emotional degree of these texts increases. Until two decades ago, the vocabulary used in online publications by the authorities was impossible, being limited by the rules of political etiquette [8].

IX. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF MANAGING POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET. DEIDEOLOGIZATION OR REIDEOLOGIZATION?

The question of the ability of the state to control political discourse in the age of the Internet is controversial. The prevailing position is that the Internet offers the prospect of the triumph of democracy and is the most effective means of combating autocratic regimes. The state, according to this position, cannot and should not control the political discourse. The subjects of discourse are not the state, but representatives of civil society. Clay Shirki cites, in particular, the failure of China's Golden Shield project, which is to establish mechanisms for filtering virtual network content in the Internet, as evidence of the impossibility of state control over political discourse in the Internet system. political objectives [28].

Of course, sites can be censored. But it is virtually impossible to do it systematically under a single

political platform even if such a task was set. Trivially, such censorship is easily overcome by the placement of sites on foreign servers. As of 2014, 35% of the zone's sites are located on foreign servers. And 15% of the zone Russia At the same time, most of the hostings used are located in the United States and Germany, which in itself imposes a certain political imprint. for reasons of being outside national jurisdiction, which is directly related to the prevention of possible censorship [29].

Another point of view, presented, for example, by the author of the concept of the Twitter revolution professor of Stanford University Evgeny Morozov is that democratic transit by the very fact of the emergence of the Internet is not predetermined. Indeed, at first, states, faced with unconnomled discourse in the network, found themselves in a quandary. However, over time, with much greater resource opportunities, they began to seize the initiative. Initially, the policy in the field of the Internet consisted of trivial blocking of opposition websites. To this day, the blocking of certain sections of Wikipedia is carried out by the PRC and Turkey and is based on the anti-state propaganda contained in them. Over time, government Internet policy becomes more technologically flexible. The Internet, on the one hand, becomes a means of broad propaganda, on the other, monitoring and surveillance of oppositionists.

Evgeny Morozov himself admitted that he exaggerated the revolutionary consequences of the Internet and refused the concept of the Twitter revolution. "Many in the West," he said in an interview, said in an interview that regimes in Russia, China and Iran were doomed, that they wouldbe overthrown by social media and digital media. This has not happened, and many social networks and digital media, by contrast, have become instruments by which political regimes in countries such as Russia, China, Iran, or middle Eastern countries have only increased their influence on political and social processes." In the Western press in terms of criticism of the Internet policy of the People's Republic of China, in particular, the phenomenon of umadan - the unofficial name of pro-government bloggers and forum participants defending the Internet position of the state. is about 300,000 [30].

One can agree that the Internet alone does not prejudge the transition to any model of political organization. The direction of the transformations it sets depends on who is the subject of its use and in which the target setting sets the appropriate discourse. But, of course, one thing is that the Internet obliges the authorities to "talk" with society, to give explanations, to formulate a political agenda. The strengthening of the importance of these functions implies the restoration in a new format of the ideological component of public policy, which is directly confirmed in the world political discourse of the last decade. The wave of deidelegization is now being replaced by a wave of re-modeling, which directly contradicts many predictions of some Western liberal political scientists about the universalization of the North Atlantic model of democracy [31].

The approach proposed by A.N. Chernyakov, according to which the subject-subject relations between the government and society are based in connection with the development of the Internet, deserves attention. The government addresses the request to the society, which is expressed through some ideological discourse. The society responds to the request of the authorities, self-identifying in relation to the proposed ideological images (accepting or rejecting them) [32]. The concept of interpellation introduced by L. Alaluisser thus receives even greater potentials of disclosure in the Internet space [33].

X. POLITICAL DISCOURSE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THREATS OF "COLOR REVOLUTIONS"

The state is one of the many actors of political discourse under the new conditions. It is forced to compete with other actors for domination in the discursive space. According to the calculation, in general in the Internet in the world opposition content on political Internet resources in certain regions prevails over pro-government content, on others - comparable to it. According to the Anglo-Saxon cluster of Internet resources, 54% of sites are pro-government, 33% are opposition al-opposition and 13% are radical; in the Western European cluster - pro-government - 38%, opposition - 58%, radical - 4%; on the Latin American cluster - pro-government - 81%, opposition - 18%, radical - 1%; in the Asian cluster - pro-government - 59%, opposition - 35%, radical - 6%; in the African cluster - pro-government - 41%, opposition - 57%, radical - 2% [34].

This situation threatens global political upheaval in the long term. How this can be implemented and the possibilities of new forms of communication was illustrated by the Occupy Wall Street action of 2011, which swept in the shortest possible time more than 80 countries of the world [35]. The discourse of the movement did not correlate with any of the legal political parties. The new political and discursive spaces formed in the Internet go beyond the discursive fields of established political systems, both in their power core and in the opposition. And today, we have to state that both the government and the traditional political opposition in the struggle for "minds and hearts" in the virtual space of Internet communications lag behind, and often lose to the new actors of information networks.

The analogy used in political literature with "swarm" is appropriate in this case. The state, as well as the major political parties, have the greatest resource opportunities, and therefore the greatest opportunities for the creation of mass channels of information, including in the Internet space. But when the number of debaters with the state is unlimited, it, unable to answer each debate, is actually subjected to a swarm of chaotic attack.

Like all technologies, digital technologies are a means that, depending on the purpose of application, can have both creative and destructive consequences. In the third wave of "color revolutions" that began in the Arab Spring, it was the Internet that was actually the

main instrument as a consolidator of revolutionary forces (a discursive tool) and organizational mobilization in the "flashmobs" format [36].

Internet activist and computer engineer Wail Gonim, Google's marketing director for the Middle East and North Africa, gained worldwide notoriety as a designer of the 2011 revolution in Egypt. The Facebook page was the attraction of the Egyptian opposition movement. In 2011, Vail Gonim was named Time's winner of the world's most influential person of the year [37].

Before losing politically, the authorities lost for dominization in discourse in virtual space. At the same time, in fact, in all cases, the classic calculation of electoral preferences showed a favorable situation for the authorities. It has been found that the electorate, as a majority oriented to traditional channels of communication, and the politically active and oppositional minority, oriented to digital communications, differ significantly in their political way. Preferences. Beginning in 2011, all subsequent "color revolutions" could be described as revolutions of the digital communications era.

The discursing grid of opponents of the regime has actually been reproduced, which allows us to talk about both a single controlling subject "warming up" "color revolutions" and a certain logic of the formation of anti-government content. The key provisions of the opposition's discourse were:

Totality of corruption;

clannishness, rich and successful relatives of officials;

illegality of power status, election fraud;

suppression of dissent, political repression;

the lack of elites, the lack of social lifting;

Lies of official propaganda;

Unprofessionalism

stagnation of thought.

The ideological non-identification of anti-government discourse draws attention, which fundamentally distinguishes it from the discourse of classical revolutions, which, on the contrary, was ideologically accented [4].

What can counter the power at the national state level with the discursive matrix of "color revolutions"? It is possible to successfully resist it by countering ideological blurring of value certainty, a clear position on the main problems and challenges. The fork in the development of the information society is the choice of ways facing the authorities - 1. ejalization associated with the lack of certainty of the future, technology and self-removal from the axiologic of discourse, because of the pluralistic nature of society; 2. The systematization of information flows through the introduction into the discourse of value-meaning attitudes uniting the relevant communities, the creation of a framework of

axiological unity. Conventionally, these approaches are expressed in philosophical literature as the way of postpostmodern and neomodern. Both of them are present in the imperious discourse of nation states. Both of these trends are also found in the imperious discourse of the modern Russian state. On the one hand, it is the spread of the managerial approach, the formation of the image of the manager of the new wave as a manager - technocrat, pragmatist; on the other, the message of presidential appeals with axiological intentions, the definition of patriotism as a national idea, the characterization of Russia as a state - civilization, an appeal to traditional values, words about spiritual scrapes.

The second of these trends can be correlated with the concept of reideologization. In the People's Republic of China, the discursising line about the specifics of the national path of development and adherence to the ideas of socialism with national specificity has been fundamentally strengthened in recent years. The imperious discourse of the countries of the Arab East was blown up by the introduction of neo-Islamist components into it. The search for and legitimize of their own identical paths of development is proving to be an important component of the power discourse of Latin America. The 2016 U.S. election has brought a rift to the discourse of the American elite, updating the problem of rethinking the place of the United States of America in the world. Similar divisions are taking place in the political elite of European countries, where the focus of the controversy is questions about the attitude towards migrants and membership of the European Union. Thus, the Internet not only did not abolish the ideological component in the imperious discourse, but also became the catalyst for a new wave of axiological discourse [4].

The analysis allows us to make some adjustments to the emerging perceptions about the influence of the discursising space of the Internet on the processes of political transformation. There is no confirmation of the thesis that the internet era leads to the elimination of the state or the minimization of its role as the actor of public discourse. On the contrary, the need to communicate with the general masses of users of the network causes objectively a request for a new axiologization (reidelogization) of the overbearing discourse. Technology is changing and becoming more complex, which cannot mean the death of the state or the functional limitation of the political component of public policy.

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